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 Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel 
Peter Eldridge-Smith 
Time, yet another final frontier, poses some paradoxical challenges 
and opportunities for science fantasy and science fiction. 
Consider Tig, a misguided time-travelling assassin, who (unwittingly) 
kills his own grandmother at a time prior to her conceiving the 
prospective parent. The sequence of causal events leading up to Tig's 
birth would be broken and Tig's birth would be, in a sense, ungrounded. 
The events of one's grandmother conceiving one's parent and of the 
same grandmother's prior demise are mutually exclusive.1 Yet, given 
time travellers, it seems both events could happen. This is a paradox.2 
The paradoxes of time travel are often used to entertain, surprise or 
confound the reader, and are a distinct feature of science fantasy. 
Consider next the story of the time traveller who goes back seeking 
some clarification from Shakespeare. Shakespeare, startled by the visitor 
appearing in his home wearing funny clothes and speaking in such an 
affected manner, has him arrested for home invasion. Shakespeare was 
struggling up to this point, but picks up the book the stranger left 
behind and begins copying out the plays word for word. Things soon 
pick up generally. The sequence of events leading up to Shakespeare's 
authoring his plays forms a loop in time. This sequence of events is 
logically consistent and therefore possible, even though it is historically 
ungrounded. I term this a hypodox.3 (It is similar to "This sentence is 
true" — known to logicians as the Truth-teller.) Hypodoxes, I hope to 
demonstrate, belong more to the genre of science fiction. 
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In this article, I will distinguish between paradoxes and hypodoxes of 
time travel and suggest that these can be a useful guide to discriminating 
between science fantasy and science fiction.4 I will also briefly discuss 
David Lewis's resolution of the paradoxes of time travel. 
But clearly, time travel is fraught with difficulties. No-one should 
time-travel without a good guidebook. Don't leave the present without 
one! So first I have some definitional work to do. 
Background 
Time goes, you say? Ah no! 
Alas, time stays, we go? 
It is we who travel, not time. (I assume time is a dimension.) Talk of 
time "flying", "flowing" or "moving" is loose talk, as is, in an opposite 
way, talk about a "ray of light" — rays don't move but light does. If 
time moves, Jack Smart asks rhetorically, what then is the rate of time, 
"seconds per ------- ?".6 
There are, I acknowledge, philosophers who believe time does 
move. In such a metaphysical view, time travel is impossible, because, 
as Heraclitus said, "You cannot step into the same river twice": no 
double-dipping into the flow of time is allowed. However, even if we 
do live in such a Heraclitean world, other non-Heraclitean worlds are 
possible; and, given this, one might say that science fiction about time 
travel assumes an alternative possible universe in which time travel is 
not only possible, it is the norm. 
Normal time travel, one might say, is the movement through time we 
are all now making.7 What we shall mean here by time travel, however, 
is some other movement through time into the future or the past. It 
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fiction writer takes special care to indicate that time itself can have 
more than one dimension, as Isaac Asimov does in The End of Eternity, 
we assume there has been just one way the world was.8 So, given a fixed 
past, time travel is concerned with whether it is possible to be present 
in the past or future. 
It seems that time travel "involves the possibility of alternative succes-
sors to the present moment".9 I am unsure whether this is true in the 
same sense for objects as it is for subjects. A Tardis time machine leaving 
the present and arriving in the past does not have issues about how it 
will act. Dr Who, arriving in his Tardis, does. Deciding how to act is 
predicated on being in the present. If there is only one present, which 
seems reasonable given only one past, then how can Dr Who act in the 
past? David Lewis distinguishes the "personal" time of the time traveller 
from the "external" time of the world.10 Time travel is relative to an 
external frame of reference: the Tardis and its occupants have moved 
some moments forward in time relative to their own past, while they 
have gone back a hundred years relative to the rest of the world. This 
seems to adequately address the issue for the Tardis as an object, but 
for its occupants, how can they be in their own present, with all its 
possibilities to act, while in the world's fixed past? It appears they must 
be in the past as it was then present. 
In talking about the future, we may need to be more circumspect. 
Does the future presently exist, and if so, are future possibilities 
alternative future realities, or is there just one way our world will be? 
On the Heraclitean view, the answer is — and it's one that I suggest is 
too simple — that the future doesn't exist. To put it more rhetorically: 
According to [the] Heraclitean metaphysical conception, the 
future is genuinely open: there is no realm of determinate future 
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fact, no denizens of the future to identify or talk about, though 
of course — in the fullness of time — there will be. Travel to the 
future on this view would be ruled out because there is simply 
nowhere to go." 
Notwithstanding this alternative philosophy of time, I will assume 
there is a future accessible to time travel and, for present purposes, 
that it is the future. So I will avoid debating the question whether 
there is presently an already existent future to visit, as that would be 
tangential to our subject. 
"Time travel" can be given a slightly more precise philosophical 
definition. Philosophers, following J. M. E. McTaggart, distinguish an 
A and a B series in time. Our concept of time seems to relate both to 
an A-series of past, present and future, and a B-series of earlier and 
later. There are paradoxes and conundrums which arise in trying to 
reconcile these two series, but these are paradoxes of the concept of 
time, not the paradoxes of time travel with which we are presently 
concerned.12 It may nevertheless be helpful to distinguish time travel 
in terms of the A and B series. 
One form of time travel is along the A-series but not along the 
B-series. The protagonist's present focus moves (along the A-series) 
into the future or the past without altering the (B-series) events of his or 
her life. In Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five, Billy Pilgrim's present 
(on the A-series) moves back and forth to earlier and later experiences 
in his life (on the B-series).13 This is time travel of a sort, but not the sort 
with which science fiction is usually concerned. Call this A-series time 
travel. Science fiction is usually concerned with B-series time travel. 
Time travel for present purposes is movement along the B-series. 
B-series time travel involves physical movement through time. In B- 
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series time travel, the time traveller actually physically moves through 
time, back into the past or forward into the future (still excluding 
normal time travel). B-series time travel may also result in A-series time 
travel for subjective beings (human beings, dogs, cats or mice, perhaps 
not mushrooms) — if the experience doesn't kill them. If Algernon 
physically travels back to earlier times (on the B-series), his focus on 
what is happening now is shifted back into the past (on the A-series). 
Notice this doesn't happen to a block of cheese. One may send some 
limburger back one hundred and twenty-five years, but it cannot enjoy 
the experience. (I dare say it will not savour the moment.) From this 
point on, I will use "time travel" to refer to B-series time travel, and 
conflate travelling to earlier times on the B-series with travelling into the 
past and travelling into later times on the B-series with travelling into 
the future. If time is one dimension of our world, some constraints on 
time travel logically follow and these are also relevant to science fiction. 
In fiction, the world we are talking about may be more or less similar 
to our own. Nevertheless, science fiction involving time travel respects 
logical constraints on time travel and what is conceivably possible 
according to the laws of physics (or at least the physics of the day). 
Principles of charity may apply to how physics is extended in the story. 
My so-called "logical constraints" are not derived purely from logic 
alone. As mentioned, they follow from the assumption that time is 
one-dimensional. An author might discount this assumption. With 
this exception, contravention of a logical constraint on time travel is 
not science fiction, but science fantasy. 
Before proceeding, it would be useful to have a definition of paradox, 
so here is an example from a dictionary of literary criticism: 
[P]aradox: A statement which, though it appears self-contradictory, 
contains the basis of truth that reconciles the seeming opposites.'4 
Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel 
But this definition is more appropriate to the paradoxes used by the 
metaphysical poets. It doesn't cover paradoxes of time travel as they 
are used in science fiction or fantasy. As alluded to in the beginning 
of this paper, it is more enlightening to draw analogies between 
paradoxes of time travel and logical paradoxes. So I will provide a brief 
theory of semantic paradox and hypodox, in particular, the Liar and 
the Truth-teller (both self-referential statements). The Liar statement 
says of itself that it is false. The Truth-teller statement says of itself 
that it is true. Here are the two statements in question: 
Liar: "This statement is false". 
Truth-teller: "This statement is true". 
Consider the way in which we settle the truth of the following 
statements: 
Jack says: "What Jane says is true". 
Jane says: "What Phil says is false". 
Phil says: "What Bruce says is false". 
Bruce says: "Ariadne taught Theseus a dance". 
Say we want to know whether what Jack says is true. Well, what Jack 
says is true if Jane's statement is true, and that's true if Phil’s is not. Phil's 
statement is not true if Bruce's is true. Assuming we can settle whether 
or not Ariadne taught Theseus a dance, we can settle whether Bruce's 
statement is true, and we will then be able to settle whether Jack spoke 
truly or not. Bruce's statement can be considered a base statement upon 
which all the others are grounded, so to speak. Jack's, Jane's, Phil's and 
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Bruce's. The truth or falsity of the earlier statements in the chain can 
only be settled if the truth of Bruce s statement can be settled. The Liar 
refers to itself in a circular chain of reference. So the truth-value of the 
Liar can be settled if the truth-value of the Liar can be settled. What 
is more, the truth or falsity of the Liar can only be settled if the 
truth-value of the Liar can be settled. The Truth-teller refers to itself, 
and the same sorts of considerations apply. So both the Liar and the 
Truth-teller are ungrounded.15 There are no base statements like 
Bruce's on which they are grounded. The difference between the two 
is that the Liar is paradoxical because we cannot consistently allocate 
any truth-value to it, whereas the Truth-teller is hypodoxical because it 
might consistently take either truth-value but we have no basis for 
determining which. 
Assuming the Liar is true, then it is true that it is false. Assuming the 
Liar is false, then it is false that it is false, therefore it is true. If the 
Truth-teller is true, it is true. If the Truth-teller is false, it is false that it is 
true, therefore it is false. When "This statement is false" is said of 
another statement, we can determine its truth value by determining 
the truth value of the statement referred to. If that statement refers to 
another, we follow the referential chain until there is no need to 
consider further statements. Such statements are grounded. Liar 
paradoxes involve statements that refer to themselves or other 
statements in a loop (or in such a way that the referential chain 
always requires consideration of further statements). Truth-tellers 
also involve such circular or ungrounded reference. I will extend the 
concept of ungroundedness by analogy to paradoxes and hypodoxes of 
time travel. There is an analogy with causal chains involving loops.16 The 
causal chains of events resulting in paradoxes and hypodoxes of time 
travel loop in ways that result in causally ungrounded events. In the 
paradoxical cases, some of these events are mutually exclusive with 
other events in the past or future. 
Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel 
Paradoxes and hypodoxes of time travel 
Time travel stories provide many examples of paradox and hypodox. 
For instance, there is a story in which scientists from New Damascus 
time-travel back in history to just prior to when the Moors overran 
Europe. The time travellers save someone from being assassinated. In 
the following battle, the Moors now lose, they don't overrun Europe, 
they don't go on to found New Damascus and the history leading up 
to the scientists inventing their time machine becomes ungrounded.17 
This scenario involves mutually exclusive events occurring in the past. 
This scenario is paradoxical. 
It seems reasonable to assume that, like the first space travel, the 
"first" time travel will be unmanned. More likely still, data will be sent 
time-travelling first. If I knew how, I'd be sending information back. 
Perhaps some future people are, but we don't know how to receive it 
or even recognize it yet. Following Nicholas J. J. Smith on this matter, 
one could suppose that a previously uncontacted, primitive tribe might 
refer to passing aeroplanes as "noisy nuisance birds" while still having a 
vigorous debate about whether people will ever fly. 
There is a scientific theory that sub-atomic particles have attributes 
for Charge, Parity and Time.18 So, here is a design for a time machine. 
Just devise a device to reverse the time direction of the sub-atomic 
particles that make up the device itself and its contents. Send it back 
with a "timer switch" to reset the time direction to forward when it gets 
here in time. Indeed, if I have anything to do with it, I will be hoping 
to receive something from the future before finishing this article. And 
if I succeed I intend to send a photograph of the painting that wins 
the next Archibald prize (as well as share price futures, philosophical 
breakthroughs and ... some personal information). I will contact the 
painter to agree on terms for him or her to paint the picture from the 
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photograph. In this way, the creation of the art will involve a causal 
loop from the future.19 The scenario is similar to the one about the 
origin of Shakespeare's plays, when a future anthropoid travels back 
with a copy of The Complete Works of Shakespeare and Shakespeare 
copies his own plays word for word. There is nothing paradoxical about 
these scenarios. No mutually exclusive events occur. No contradiction 
makes these scenarios impossible. Nevertheless, the chain of events that 
leads to the creation of the painting or Shakespeare's plays goes round 
in a loop in time, from the point of view of the rest of the world. 
Not all paradoxes of time travel are about the past. An episode of the 
cartoon Catdog involved time travel into the future. Experiments were 
being performed in the present that would genetically modify a rat, but 
meanwhile Catdog time-travelled to the future and discovered that the 
descendants of this genetically-modified rat would take over the Earth; 
so Catdog returned to current time and had the experiments stopped. 
Thus the future that Catdog had visited, in which the rat's 
genetically-modified descendants took over the Earth, became 
ungrounded. Moreover, unless we admit the reality of multiple 
futures, there is only one future Catdog could have really visited, and 
it is one in which the rat has and does not have genetically-modified 
descendents. This scenario is paradoxical. 
I have provided sufficient definitions and examples to now give a 
brief analysis of paradoxes and hypodoxes of time travel. Talking about 
contradictions may not be the best way to analyse paradoxes of time 
travel. Although logicians have analysed time travel paradoxes using 
this terminology, it seems to me to be a carry-over from analysing 
paradoxes about statements. Time travel involves unusual causal 
chains of events. Events, not statements, are the basic units of time 
travel. It is better to say some events are mutually exclusive, rather than 
Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel 
contradictory. (Mutually exclusive events need not be equivalent to each 
other's complement.) A causal chain of events is a sequence of events 
such that each is a cause of its successor, apart from the last event in the 
chain. Causal chains normally go in the same direction through time 
without any loops or jumps relative to the B-series. Events involved in 
causal chains without loops are grounded. Events resulting from unusual 
causal chains with loops are ungrounded. 
Notice the analogy with ungrounded statements that form 
referential loops. I have extended the concept of ungroundedness based 
on this analogy. In such causal loops in time, some consequent event 
in a causal chain has a causally antecedent event that occurs later in 
B-series time. Not all ungrounded events are paradoxical or 
hypodoxical. Hypodoxes are loops in a causal chain, not just loops in 
time. If Doc Brown in Back to the Future had not only travelled a 
hundred years backwards in time but also far enough West that no 
consequential event of his actions in the past affected the locality 
from which he departed for a hundred and fifty years, no paradox or 
hypodox would arise. An unusual causal chain would result in paradox 
if it would bring about an ungrounded event that is mutually exclusive 
(in relation to the B-series) with some other event in the chain. Tom's 
death in 1870 is mutually exclusive with his assassination in 1851. 
A science fiction writer may attempt to address certain issues about 
time travel: how it might be possible, how to reverse time, how to 
speed up or jump from one moment to another — discontinuous — 
moment, how to stop once one starts. H. G. Wells, for example, has 
some discussion about whether the time traveller can be seen and the 
hazards of stopping when one is embedded in a concrete wall. Wells 
doesn't say much about how time travel is possible.20 His description of 
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of the same name, and seems more like fantasy than science fiction. 
In a story that is neither paradoxical nor hypodoxical, Wells' time 
traveller moves forward in time, returns home for dinner, and goes 
back to the future. However, in the most recent movie adaptation of 
this story, the time traveller attempts to change the future's future — 
thus engendering paradox. 
David Lewis's resolution of the paradoxes of time travel 
Now, what can a philosopher really say about time travel? Isn't it the 
domain of science? Well, David Lewis, one of the most influential 
analytic philosophers of the last quarter of the last century has already 
said a lot. Philosophers analyse time travel from the point of view of 
what is possible. For example, the Time Cop movies, in which Jean 
Claude van Damme and Jason Lee are sent back as time police to 
prevent an evil mastermind from altering the course of history, are 
illogical. Whatever has happened in the past is past, and therefore 
already includes whatever the time traveller did in the past. An evil 
mastermind may travel back to the past and do whatever he or she 
did there, and the present will be just the same. 
The makers of Terminator knew better. A neural-networked 
computer linked up across the globe becomes conscious and decides to 
wipe out human beings. It sends a machine back in time to terminate 
the mother of the future leader of the human resistance. Anticipating 
the reality TV genre, the terminator is hopelessly foiled by a string of 
increasingly improbable events, and only succeeds in bringing about 
the future it sought to avoid. 
Lewis's view of laissez faire time travel is that time guardians are not 
required. The past (at least) is fixed and contingencies are sufficient to 
both allow for time travel and prevent time travellers doing anything 
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other than what they already did in the past. As our history isn't full of 
strangers failing to assassinate Hitler, we may conclude that either there 
is not much time-travelling going on in our world, or that our future 
time travellers have even more sense than a self-aware computer with a 
brain the size of the planet, and are not attempting the impossible. 
In Terminator 2, any sense of reality went by the wayside, as it tends 
to do with cash-in sequels. Similarly, the Back to the Future movies, 
in which photographs register changes in the then future present and 
characters scurry through scenes to correct the alterations they have 
made to what the present will be like, are — as you'd expect — just 
fantasy. Even trivial changes to the past are impossible. Ray Bradbury's A 
Sound of Thunder, in which a time traveller alters history by treading on a 
butterfly, is equally unrealistic.21 As Sorensen recounts Lewis as saying: 
"Time travellers cannot alter the past because they are already part of the 
past".22 There is no need at all for time guardians to prevent time 
travellers causing any change in the past. Lewis comments that: 
Not all science fiction writers are clear-headed, to be sure, and 
inconsistent time travel stories have often been written. But 
some writers have thought the problems through with great care, 
and their stories are perfectly consistent.23 
Lewis's restriction on what time travellers can and cannot do 
is contingent. If something did not happen in 1921, then no time 
traveller can go back and make it happen; they may travel back, 
but they will only succeed in doing what is already in the past. By 
extension, as in the Catdog example, the present is the future's past, 
and we cannot go to the future and come back and make the present 
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While I think Lewis's laissez faire solution is correct, there are a few 
points that I want to add. Firstly, there are things that a time traveller 
necessarily cannot do. (This is not a purely logical necessity, as it draws 
on our conceptions of time and life.) A time traveller cannot go back 
and kill him or herself. It is more irrational for a time traveller to think 
he could go back and kill himself than for him to think he could go 
back and kill Hitler. We can conclude a priori that a time traveller just 
cannot have killed himself in the past. We can draw this conclusion 
independently of any empirical facts, given one-dimensional time: the 
fixedness of the past follows from one-dimensional time. Two mutually 
exclusive events cannot occur at the same time in the past. If the time 
traveller is alive now, whenever now is, then he or she was alive prior 
to now. Therefore, the time traveller did not terminate his or her own 
life prior to now. 
Secondly, hypodoxical time travel, although also ungrounded, is 
possible. Lewis's argument against paradoxical time travel does not rule 
out hypodoxical time travel. Hypodoxical time travel does not cause 
any events that are mutually exclusive with other events, unlike the 
paradoxes of time travel. It does seem odd to me, as a logician, that 
philosophers are committed (as I have argued) to hypodoxical time 
travel being possible if they don't think hypodoxical statements like the 
Truth-teller make a real statement or have consequences. Yet the 
no-statement account of the Truth-teller is a common view. 
I am pushing an analogy, but it seems to me there is an analogy and 
that the two types of hypodox are not treated even-handedly.24A story 
involving a time travel paradox is a story about the impossible, involving 
mutually exclusive events. A Liar paradox entails a contradiction; so 
a Liar statement is naively both true and false, and often dismissed 
by theoreticians as neither true nor false. Truth-teller hypodoxes are 
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sometimes also said to be neither true nor false. In contrast, it would be 
incoherent to say of a time travel paradox, hypodox or any ungrounded 
event that it is neither possible nor impossible. Paradoxes of time 
travel are simply impossible; hypodoxes are possible. The bivalence of 
being either possible or impossible seems compelling, even more so 
than being true or not true. In the case of time travel, its paradoxes 
and hypodoxes are among the sorts of chains of events that are either 
impossible or possible. 
Epistemic variations on time travel paradoxes 
Whether he or she intends to or not, the time traveller cannot change 
the past. Nevertheless, there is a distinction to be made. If the 
time-travelling limburger goes back a hundred and twenty-five years, 
lands on a casket of guns on a train in winter and ruins the lives of the 
occupants of that sealed and heated carriage, then it already did so.25 
Likewise, a subjective being cannot do anything in the past that they 
haven't already done, nor can they undo anything they've already 
done. In this respect, they are in the same situation as the limburger, 
and any apparent paradox is non-epistemic. The paradoxes of time 
travel that I have been analysing involve mutually exclusive events. 
With respect to these paradoxes, events involving Dr Who or the 
limburger are subject to the same constraint: that mutually exclusive 
events are impossible. The difference for a subjective being is that he 
or she may intend to do or undo something in the past. The same 
constraint prevents them, but there are also paradoxes at an epistemic 
level: if one can time travel back into the past, one can intend to go 
back there to do something that one can do, in that one has all the 
capability and opportunity. However, if it is something one did not 
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to be guided by beliefs. If one intends to do something in the past, 
one ought to believe one can. If one is rational, one knows that one 
cannot alter the past (even given the capability and opportunity to 
time travel). So it seems that a rational being ought not to intend to 
change the past. 
What necessarily prevents someone changing the past? How can a 
contingent event in the past be necessarily unchangeable for a time 
traveller who arrives there with intention, capability and opportunity? 
Tig sets off to kill Tom some years earlier, for no credit but because of 
a utilitarian miscalculation and paucity of principles. Tom is alive now, 
when Tig departs. Tig has the intent, wherewithal and opportunity in 
the past. Tom's surviving Tig's attack is a contingent event. How is it 
that Tig necessarily cannot kill Tom in the past? Lewis distinguishes what 
Tig can and cannot do relative to the information taken into account. 
If all that is given is that Tig has the intent, capability and opportunity, 
then Tig can kill Tom. However, if it is given that Tom is alive now, 
then he cannot have died earlier; so Tig cannot kill Tom in the past. In 
the past, Tig— the one from the future — had a good chance of killing 
Tom, but he slipped on a banana peel or something, and failed. All of 
Tig's descendants perpetuate the same utilitarian miscalculation and 
go back to the same year and attempt to kill Tom. Are there enough 
bananas in history to stop them?26 Should Tom be paranoid, maintain a 
positive attitude or believe he lives a charmed life? After all, the best 
assassins from the future have failed to kill him up until now. Tom 
captures one of these assassins, who reveals Tom's whole life story under 
the influence of a powerful truth serum. Should Tom be a fatalist? The 
philosophical issues of time travel compound for subjective beings. 
Actually, a rational being can intend to change the past, in the sense 
that a time traveller can affect the past. The only logical constraint 
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is that one cannot do other than what one actually did. This rules 
out Tom being killed one year and alive the next. Because Tig— the 
one from the future — did not kill Tom, he cannot go back and 
succeed next time around. There is no second chance for Tig (or his 
descendants). For some misguided reason, he time-travelled back to 
kill Tom — attempting the impossible. It's impossible because Tig's 
attack on Tom had already failed, not because he did not have a chance at 
the time. No event on the B-series up to the time of Tig's attack 
prevented Tig from succeeding. After that event on the B-series, Tig 
never gets a second chance. 
Conclusion 
A more logical time traveller will attempt something possible, like 
sending oneself a picture of the painting that wins a coveted art prize 
in the future. However, if one was going to do that, one might know 
that one was going to do that as soon as one received the picture 
(and explanatory note) from the future. Such foreknowledge does 
seem strange. The most surprising thing about this though is still the 
possibility of some event in the present being caused by something 
in the future that is itself a causal consequent of the present event. I 
do not for a moment believe in the auto-genesis of Shakespeare's plays, 
but the story about their ungrounded production, copied out from a 
future edition of the Complete Works of Shakespeare is, surprisingly, 
logically possible. 
In summary, time travel may involve causally ungrounded chains of 
events. If any of those events are mutually exclusive with the way the 
world was (or even is, as in the Catdog example), paradox ensues and 
such a story is science fantasy not science fiction, at least in this respect. 
Some of the time travel paradoxes are necessarily paradoxical, like 
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attempting to kill one's earlier self; most are contingently paradoxical. 
Hypodoxical time travel scenarios are logically possible and appropriate 
material for science fiction. 
1 Unless, of course, Grandmother is a time traveller too. 
2 It is not a classic literary paradox like Donne's "Death, thou shall die", bul it is more in the vein of a 
logical paradox — like the Liar paradox, concerning the truth of "I am lying". While logicians and 
poets both delight in paradox, logicians are generally concerned to distinguish what is possible from 
what is paradoxical and insulate the former from the latter, whereas poetic authors put forward para- 
doxes as metaphysical truths. Antinomies have been an age-old source of metaphysical debate for 
philosophers too — ironically so, because there has always been lacking a logical analysis of the con- 
cept of paradox that supports their direct use or denial. Paradoxes have also marked some important 
junctures in the intellectual history of mathematics and science. Personally, I do believe a general 
theory of paradox is possible. Cf. Roy Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox (Oxford: OUP, 2003). 
For this article's purposes though, in both philosophy and literature, paradoxes and hypodoxes of 
time travel concern what is impossible and what is — surprisingly, perhaps — possible. 
3 I coined and recommended "hypodox" as a general term for a Truth-teller-like expression in my pa- 
per "Paradoxes of Truth, Satisfaction and Membership", presented at the 2005 Australasian Associa- 
tion of Philosophy Conference. It is particularly useful to be able to form an adjective, "hypodoxical". 
The present article can be read independently. Nevertheless, I have produced it as part of a project to 
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